If mistrustful parties A and B control two or more appropriately located sites, special relativity can be used to guarantee that a pair of messages exchanged by A and B are independent. Using this fact, an unconditionally secure relativistic bit commitment protocol, RBC1, was recently defined. Security is maintained in RBC1 by exchanging a sequence of messages whose transmission rate increases exponentially in time. We define here a variant, RBC2, which requires a constant transmission rate and can in practice be securely maintained for long periods. We also introduce a zero-knowledge proof protocol which allows A to convince B of the value of any function of N relativistic bit commitments without giving any further information. Applying this to the XOR of two bit commitments made by RBC1 or RBC2, we define two further relativistic bit commitment protocols, RBC3 and RBC4. These two protocols are permanently unconditionally secure against classical attack and require only a constant transmission rate. We conjecture that they are also unconditionally secure against quantum attack.
Introduction
The discovery of secure quantum key distribution [1] has sparked a cryptographic revolution. It would be good to know which other cryptographic tasks can be implemented in a way guaranteed secure by physical principles. We focus here on bit commitment, a powerful cryptographic primitive whose potential for physically guaranteed security has not yet been fully investigated.
Several papers [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] have investigated whether physically secure bit commitment and related protocols exist. It is known that there is no unconditionally secure classical or quantum bit commitment protocol which can be implemented by two separated parties whose locations are unconstrained. [5, 6, 7, 8] On the other hand, given unbounded communication capacity, a bit commitment can be maintained indefinitely with unconditional security if each party controls two separate sites whose locations are appropriately coordinated, and this can be achieved without relying on trust. [11] The protocol described in Ref. [11] requires a sequence of communications to continue between the parties throughout the interval between commitment and revelation. This is not in itself a serious weakness. However, the data strings to be communicated increase exponentially in time, while the time interval available for each communication remains constant. Thus the protocol eventually saturates any finite communication channel, making it impractical for long term bit commitment.
In practice, current bit commitment protocols rely for their security on the assumption that some computational task is sufficiently hard that it cannot be carried out during the lifetime of the protocol. While such assumptions presently seem well founded, the construction of large quantum computers would make the security of present protocols questionable. The importance of bit commitment in modern cryptography, the need for future-proofing some presently used commitments, and the desirability of preparation for a quantum computational era all motivate the search for a practical unconditionally secure bit commitment protocol.
We describe here a bootstrapping method by which bit commitments such as that described in Ref. [11] can be combined to construct bit commitment protocols which require only a constant communication rate to maintain their security. The method can be applied in a number of ways, but we focus here on two particular protocols. These protocols rely on two parties each controlling two well separated sites, and the communication rates required are inversely proportional to the separation. We examine the security of the protocols against classical attacks by either party, and sketch arguments to show that they are indeed secure. We conjecture that they are also secure against quantum attacks. If so, they appear to be practical solutions to the bit commitment problem that rely on no computational complexity assumptions.
Definitions and conventions
In a bit commitment protocol Alice and Bob exchange data in such a way that Bob obtains an encoding of a bit chosen by Alice. For the protocol to be secure against Bob, it must guarantee that Bob cannot decode the bit until Alice chooses to reveal it by supplying further information. To be secure against Alice, it must guarantee that the bit is genuinely fixed between commitment and revelation: there must not be two different decodings of the bit which leave Alice free to reveal either 0 or 1, as she wishes. We refer to a protocol as classical if the protocol can be followed by exchanging classical information, and as quantum if it requires the exchange of quantum information. We follow the formal definitions of perfect and unconditional security given in Ref. [5] .
We assume now that the parties are confident that spacetime has an approximately Minkowski causal structure in their neighbourhood, set c = 1, and consider the following cryptographic scenario. Alice and Bob agree on a frame, on local coordinates, and on the location of two sites x 1 , x 2 in their neighbourhood. Alice and Bob are required to erect laboratories, including sending and receiving stations, within a distance δ of the sites, where ∆x = |x 1 − x 2 | ≫ δ. These laboratories need not be restricted in size or shape, but must not overlap. We refer to the laboratories in the vicinity of x i as A i and B i , for i = 1 or 2. In practice, A 1 and A 2 could contain separate individuals, but we assume that they are collaborating with complete mutual trust and with prearranged agreements on how to proceed, to the extent that we can identify them together simply as Alice; similarly B 1 and B 2 , who are identified as Bob.
Alice and Bob each trust absolutely the security and integrity of their own laboratories, in the sense that they are confident both that all their sending, receiving and analysing devices function properly and also that nothing in their laboratories can be observed by outsiders. They trust nothing outside their own laboratories.
The precise locations of the laboratories need not be disclosed, nor need Alice or Bob trust that the other has set up laboratories in the stipulated region. Each can verify that the other is following the protocol by checking the times at which signals arrive. If the protocol is followed, these times guarantee that particular pairs of signals, going from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice, were generated independently. To make sure the timings are synchronised and the channels are working at (sufficiently near) light speed, the parties may check in advance that test signals sent out from each of Bob's laboratories receive a response within time 2δ from Alice's neighbouring laboratory, and vice versa.
Throughout this paper, we consider classical protocols. When it comes to discussing their security, unless we explicitly specify otherwise, we will consider only classical attacks.
That is, we will generally assume that classical special relativity is the underlying theory, and hence that Alice and Bob are restricted to carrying out operations that can be implemented by storing, communicating and manipulating classical information. We postpone full discussion of the wider possibilities made available by quantum theory to a future paper.
The relativistic bit commitment protocol RBC1
First recall the bit commitment protocol -call it RBC1 -described in Ref. [11] , which incorporates an earlier protocol of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Widgerson. [12, 9] Alice and Bob first agree a large power of two, N = 2 m , where m is the security parameter for RBC1. All additions in the protocol are carried out modulo N . Before the protocol begins, A 1 and A 2 agree a list {m 1 , m 2 , . . .} of independently chosen random numbers in the range 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. Alice and Bob also fix a time interval, ∆t << ∆x, during which each round of communication between A i and B i (for i = 1 or 2) must be completed. Now, between time t = 0 and t = ∆t, B 1 sends A 1 a labelled pair (n 1 0 , n 1 1 ) of randomly chosen distinct numbers in the range 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. On receiving these numbers, A 1 returns either the number n 1 0 + m 1 or n 1 1 + m 1 , depending whether she wants to commit a 0 or a 1, quickly enough that her message is completed before time δ + 2∆t and so received by B 1 before time 2δ + 2∆t. At time t = T = ∆x − 2∆t − 3δ, B 2 asks A 2 to commit to him the binary form a 1 m−1 . . . a 1 0 of m 1 . This is achieved by sending A 2 a set of m labelled pairs (n 2 0 , n 2 1 ), . . . , (n m+1 0 , n m+1 1 ), which arrive by time t = ∆x − ∆t − 2δ, and asking A 2 to return n 2
Next, at time t = 2T , B 1 asks A 1 to commit the binary forms of the random numbers We adopt the convention that the suffices i are defined modulo 2, so that for example A i+1 refers to the alternative laboratory to A i .
These commitments continue at regular intervals separated by T , consuming increasingly long segments of the random string shared by the A i , until one or both of the A i chooses to unveil the originally committed bit: we assume that the A i have previously agreed under which conditions either or both will unveil. For A i to unveil, she reveals to RBC1 is clearly unconditionally secure. [11] Its main disadvantage is that it requires the A i to send a sequence of strings of exponentially increasing length to the B i , each in a time interval of length less than ∆t. It also requires the A i to have previously generated a list of random numbers whose length depends exponentially on the duration of the protocol.
Alternatively, if those numbers are generated by one of the A i -say A 1 -during the protocol, they must be securely transmitted to A 2 after generation, which again requires communications of exponentially increasing length. Similarly, the B i have to generate -before or during the protocol -a string of random numbers whose length depends exponentially on its duration. The protocol begins in the same way as RBC1, with B 1 sending to A 1 a labelled pair (n 1 0 , n 1 1 ) of distinct random numbers, and A 1 returning n 1 a + m 1 to commit the bit a, quickly enough that her message is completed before time δ + 2∆t and so received by B 1 before time 2δ + 2∆t. Now, at time T , B 2 sends A 2 a list (n 2 1 , . . . , n 2 N ) of all the numbers from 0 to N − 1 in some random order. A 2 commits the number m 1 to B 2 by returning the number n 2 m 1 +m 2 . At time 2T , B 1 sends A 1 an independently generated randomly ordered list (n 3 1 , . . . , n 3 N ), and A 1 commits m 2 by returning n 3 m 2 +m 3 . And so forth: between times N T and N T +∆t, B N+1 sends A N+1 the randomly ordered list (n N+1 However, if A 1 and A 2 have previously agreed which random substitution m ′ r will be tried at stage r + 1, then A r+2 will know at stage r + 2 whether the substitution was effective in flipping the commitment or not. If not, she can try another random substitution at stage r + 2, again with probability 1/N of successfully flipping the original commitment. The A i can continue this tactic until successful; if they do so, the expected number of steps which it will take them to successfully cheat, and know that they have done so, is of order N . The protocol is not unconditionally secure, and is highly insecure for commitments maintained over time intervals comparable to or greater than N T .
Since any cheating attempt by either A i can at best randomise a commitment, the above appears to be Alice's optimal cheating strategy. Note that it is not without risk:
if revelation is called for in the middle of a cheating attempt, Alice will not be able to unveil a valid commitment. Note too that the protocol may well be reasonably secure and practically implementable for quite significant intervals. Naively, in each round Bob needs to supply Alice with 2 m numbers of m bits each. (There are probably more efficient codings for an element of the permutation group of 2 m elements, but we use the naive estimate here.) If we suppose that δ is negligible compared to ∆t and ∆t = 0.1∆x, this means that for a separation ∆x ∼ 0.1sec Bob needs to supply m2 m bits in 0.01sec at each round. This is the critical part of the protocol so far as channel capacity is concerned:
Alice's m bit replies are relatively negligible. A value of m = 20 is probably practical, and would give an insecurity threshold of ∼ 10 5 sec, meaning that terrestrial implementations of the protocol can be relatively secure for ∼ 10 2 or 10 3 sec. Moreover, these values scale as (∆x) 2 : a quite unadventurous space-based implementation with ∆x ∼ 10 2 sec would be reasonably secure for ∼ 10 9 sec or roughly 50 years.
Linking relativistic bit commitments
Consider now a situation in which A 1 and A 2 are maintaining two bit commitments by one of the protocols just described. The commitments need not have been originally made at the same time, but we suppose, for simplicity, that the timings are now such that each commitment calls for messages from A 1 in the same intervals, say (N T, N T + 2∆t + 2δ) for N even, and (hence) for messages from A 2 in the same intervals (N T, N T + 2∆t + 2δ) for N odd. Two initially asynchronous commitments can always be synchronised in this way by sending some of the messages in one earlier than the protocol stipulates.
In this section we describe a method by which Alice can link two commitments made via RBC1 or RBC2 by revealing their sum modulo 2 to Bob, without giving away any information about either bit. Let us suppose that we require A 1 to reveal the sum to B 1 .
Suppose too, for simplicity, that A 1 knows all the random numbers used by both sides in the protocols to date, except for the last set of random numbers sent by B 2 to A 2 in the two protocols. This will be the case if A 2 has communicated all information received to A 1 as soon as possible and if the protocols have followed standard timings in the two steps up to this point. The method generalises in an obvious way to cover situations in which there are other random numbers A 1 does not know.
We first fix notation that can be applied to either RBC1 or RBC2 in this situation.
Let the two bits originally committed be a 1 and a 2 . For definiteness, we suppose they are identical: a 1 = a 2 = A; the protocol below can obviously be modified to allow for the alternative possibility, a 1 = a 2 . We use a as a variable denoting the two possible values of a 1 = a 2 . We use n 1 and n 2 as vector variables denoting possible values of the sets of random numbers sent by B 2 to A 2 in his last message in the two protocols and we write their actual values as N 1 and N 2 ; similarly, we use m 1 and m 2 as variables for the sets of random numbers used by A 2 in the commitments sent in their last message to B 2 in the two protocols and we write their actual values as M 1 and M 2 .
A 1 now sends to B 1 a total of N ′ labelled batches of messages; N ′ is a security parameter for this sub-protocol, and should be large. Each message in a batch takes the following form:
If a 1 = a 2 = c(a) and your last random numbers in the two protocols were n 1 , n 2 and our random numbers in the last commitments of the two protocols were c(m 1 ), c(m 2 ) then B 2 will have received commitments of the form c(n ′ 1 ), c(n ′ 2 ). Here c(x) denotes the fact that the string x is sent, not en clair, but committed bitwise via further RBC1 protocols, which again are to be maintained by the A i and the B i . The remaining parts of the message are sent en clair. The values n ′ 1 , n ′ 2 are the correct values calculable from a and from n 1 , n 2 , m 1 , m 2 , given knowledge of the earlier commitments in each protocol. Each batch consists of a list of messages with all possible values of the bit a and of the random strings n 1 , n 2 , m 1 , m 2 , with the subsets corresponding to fixed values of a, m 1 , m 2 -but not the values themselves -identified, and with these subsets in random order.
The entire collection of batches of messages are sent to B 1 to arrive by time N T + ∆t.
Between times N T + ∆t and N T + 2∆t + 2δ, B 1 sends a message to A 1 selecting a random subset of (N ′ − 1) of the batches. Between times N T + 2∆t + 2δ and N T + 3∆t + 4δ, commitments of all messages in the (N ′ − 1) batches selected by B 1 and the commitments of n ′ 1 , n ′ 2 (but not of a, m 1 , m 2 ) from the message in the identified subset of the final batch with the correct values of n ′ 1 , n ′ 2 -and hence, if the protocol has been followed, also of n 1 , n 2 -which are now known to A 1 . The B i exchange data to read the unveilings of these commitments. They verify that all the messages in the (N ′ − 1) selected batches do indeed correspond to valid statements, consistent with the data exchanged earlier in the commitments, that the batches do indeed each comprise lists with all possible values of a, m 1 , m 2 , grouped in subsets corresponding to all values of n 1 , n 2 , as specified, and that the values of n ′ 1 , n ′ 2 and n 1 , n 2 in the message Alice selects from the final batch do indeed correspond to the commitments received and random numbers sent earlier. If these tests are satisfied, Bob accepts that the committed bits a 1 and a 2 are identical. Alice and Bob may then continue the protocol for the bit commitment of either a 1 or a 2 or both -which last, though apparently redundant, may be useful in a larger protocol. The remaining bit commitments used in the sub-protocol and not yet unveiled by Alice are abandoned without unveiling, so that Bob extracts no information from them.
Recall that we are taking classical special relativity as the underlying theory here, and so consider security only against classical attacks. Clearly, the protocol is secure against Bob, who ultimately learns no more information than is already available to him through the two bit commitment protocols.
Alice's cheating possibilities are limited by the fact that (N ′ −1) of the N ′ batches will be examined by Bob. If she includes an incorrect message in the protocol or mislabels a subset of messages, but makes no attempt to cheat when asked to reveal the (N ′ −1) batches Bob selects, her probability of escaping detection is 1/N ′ . Her probability of successfully cheating in this revelation can be made arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently large security parameters for the RBC1 commitments.
If all the messages are correct, and all the subsets correctly labelled, but Alice identifies the wrong batch of messages from the unselected subset, then she will escape detection only if the incorrect value of an m i which she chooses corresponds fortuitously to a valid bit commitment or if she succeeds in cheating in revealing the corresponding values of n ′ i . Again, the probabilities of success can be made arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently large security parameters for the relevant bit commitments.
In summary, Alice's probability of persuading Bob, incorrectly, that the two bit commitments are equal can be bounded by 4p + ǫ, where p, the probability of her cheating on one of the two original commitments, can be made arbitrarily small by choosing suitably large N and ǫ can be made arbitrarily small by choosing suitably large N ′ . So the linking sub-protocol is unconditionally secure against classical attacks.
RBC3 and RBC4: unconditionally secure finite channel protocols
The possibility of linking relativistic bit commitments is rather useful. For example, it allows flexibility in partial revelation of a multi-bit commitment: information about a binary string m = m n . . . m 0 , committed digit by digit, can be revealed not only by opening the commitments for some of the digits but also (by extensions of the method above) by revealing complete or partial information about arbitrary joint functions of the digits.
Linking relativistic bit commitments also produces new relativistic bit commitment protocols. We illustrate the possibilities here with two examples: RBC3, defined by linking a sequence of RBC1 protocols, and RBC4, defined by linking two RBC2 protocols.
Both can be maintained indefinitely across finite communication channels and are unconditionally secure against classical attack. RBC4 begins by A 1 and B 1 initiating two RBC2 commitments at the same time, by which Alice commits two copies of the same bit to Bob. At every subsequent stage of the RBC2 protocols, the A i and B i also initiate linking sub-protocols, by which Alice persuades Bob that the two commitments remain identical and correspond to well-defined bits.
The net effect, in each case, is that communication channels with a constant timeindependent capacity suffice. In RBC3, each RBC1 bit commitment is maintained only for the same finite duration, so that the exponential increase characteristic of RBC1 is nullified. Security is maintained by the security of RBC1 and the demonstration that each pair in the sequence of RBC1 commitments is linked. In RBC4, the RBC2 and linking protocols all require only a constant transmission rate. Security is maintained here by closing off the cheating possibility open to Alice in an individual RBC2: if she randomly alters either or both RBC2 commitments, she is unlikely to be able to carry out a subsequent linking sub-protocol successfully, so that her cheating attempt will almost surely be detected.
Comments
While full security analyses remain to be performed, the various protocols described here suggest that relativistic cryptography has a promising future. In particular, if, as we conjecture, the protocols RBC3 and RBC4 are secure against quantum as well as classical attacks by either party, then unconditionally secure relativistic bit commitments of arbitrarily long duration appear to be a practical possibility.
It may well be that none of the protocols described is close to optimal. For example, there are many alternative linking strategies involving more than two bit commitments which can be investigated. Linking protocols other than RBC1 and RBC2, or using methods other than linking, might also be fruitful. It would be very interesting to understand how to commit one or more bits with optimal security for any given channel capacity in the relativistic scenario we have described, and more generally to understand how separation, duration, channel capacity and optimal attainable security are related.
